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Abstract
Peace and safety are the most important challenges in the hierarchy of human needs. Poland in 2007
accepted the new Strategy of National Safety (SBNRP). Nowadays, Poland is before making a mo-
mentous decision about installation a part of American anti-missile shield (NMD). It is important not
only for Poland, but also for Europe and world. In this article we want to present various alternatives
of Poland safety management. The aim of the paper will be to choose the best variant for our country.
In the article it was showed complexity of this problem (many criteria and subcriteria and their de-
pendences and feedback. In this problem it is possible to find solution only by using multicriteria
decision making methods. We used ANP (Analytic Network Process). In the paper we accepted three
mutually non excluding defensive systems of Poland. As a result of conducted prioritatization of the
model, two mathematical formulae (multiplicative and additive – negative) give similar results for the
common defence policy within EU, including middle and far of anti-missile shield.
1. INTRODUCTION
Peace and safety have always been the most important challange in the hierarchy of
human needs. For ages the human kind has weighted two different values – freedom
and safety have been in conflict. In a sense one limits the other. You cannot have full
freedom and full safety. Poland’s fate was connected with numerous conflicts and wars
whereby our country lost milion of its citizens. The off the communist regime in 1989
arose hope for stable peace in Poland and Europe. We stood in front of a chance of
building a stable safety system. Polish negotiation and mediations in 1989 at around
table between communist goverment and opposition are best case for other countries.
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Unfotunately, safety does no have one, easily acceptable perspective for analysis.
Understanding of safety shall always be related to one of theoretical academic orienta-
tions. In a perspective of a functional theory it is one of need of a system which has to
be fulfilled in order fort it to survive; its’s a natural and desirable state of a system
– everything that lowers the level of safety, from the point of functional theory is a so-
cial malfunction or pathology.
In turn, from a perspective of conflict theory, safety can be treated as a rather unsta-
ble parameter of a society (also international society), unstable because social systems
in a systematic way “create conflicts, most frequently created in connection with divi-
sion of rare and material goods but also such as authority, knowledge or information
and prestige etc. Safety is therefore ephemeric creature – it appears and disappears as
the interests of various social groups.
Further considerations assume after K. Żebrowska (2006) a definition of national
safety as state of certainty, lack of threat a sense that basic state values such as surviver,
territorial integrity, political independence and freedom of international operations and
development are state protected against external threats.
At the moment Poland faces a decision for installing part of American Missile De-
fence all over our country. This decision is important not only for Poland but also for
Europe and the world. This decision can be analysed from four different perspectives
– benefits, costs, opportunities and risks. Each of them, in turn, is a set of various fac-
tors – economic, social, political, technological and others. Creators of Polish foreign
policy, looking at this problem in a complex way it attempts to solve this largest prob-
lem for us nowadays. Some of politicians and academicians supports a Missile Defense
System, others are against. In the context of this discussion, the paper presents various
alternatives of Poland safety management shall be presented. Therefore we aim to
choose the best alternative for our country. The article also presents the complexity of
this problem (significant number of criteria and subcriteria, as well as interdependen-
cies and loops among factors). This problem can be solved only with use of multicrite-
rial methods. To solve this probem we used Analytical Network Process (ANP) method
(Saaty, 2004).
2. NATIONAL SAFETY STRATEGY FOR POLAND
The notion of strategy means a theory and practice definng rules and general meth-
ods of operations by managerial bodies in a given field, framed to aims and their im-
plementation with high level of correlation between space and time (B. Balcerowicz,
2002). National Safety Strategy (RPDA) (2007) defines national interests and formu-
lates strategeic goals in accordance with main goal in Constitution of Poland. The
document states as follows:
 Poland is a sovereign and democratic state in Central Europe, with high demo-
graphic, political, military and economic potential. It desires to implement its
national interests and aspirations of citizens to safe and dignified life in a peace-
ful and stable enviroment. It provides conditions for pursuing welfare while
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honoring law and democratic values. At the same time it intends to input imple-
menting common values and developing cooperations mechanisms within Euro-
pean Union, in euroatlantic and global scale, in order to guarantee lasting world
safety;
 Poland operates in a complex and well developed international environment. As
a member state of politically, militarily and economically strong organizations of
North Atlantic Treaty and the European Union – it becomes a significant mem-
ber of international cooperation. NATO and EU membership and the alliance
with United States ensured high level of safety for Poland and are one of the ba-
sic guarantess of its internal development and international position.
Poland membership in the European Union caused widening and evolution of the
notion of national interests and the need to strengthene national and European identity
of Poland in a united Europe. Probably the most important element of the above decla-
ration is the last sentence – relating safety problems to the notion of national interest an
pointing to the meaning of national interest and the consequences of Poland’s member-
ship in the EU to understanding of the national interest.
National interest is defined as follows:
Basic national interests are unchanging […] and follow fundamental and unchanging values
of Poland, and their implementation are the main need of state and its citizens. According to the
Constitution of Poland they include: ensuring independence, territorial intactness, freedom,
safety, human rights honoring and also preservation of national heritage and natural environmnt
preservation within sustainable development conditions [ibid., p. 4].
National interests of the Republic of Poland can be divided into three groups: vital,
important and other significant. Vital national interes are related to ensuring the survival
of state and its citizens. It encompasses the need for preserving independence of state, it
territorial integrity and intactness of borders, ensuring cictizens safety, human and basic
rigths and also stregthening of democratic political order. Their implementation is an
absolute priority of Poland’s safety policy. Significant interests are guarantee of constant
and sustainable country civilization and economic growth, providing conditions for the
increase of society welfare, science and technology development and proper protection of
national heritage and identity, and also natural environment [ibid., p. 5].
Other important national interest of Poland are related with the drive to have
a strong state international position and a possibility of effective promotion of Polish
interests within an international framework. They also include strenghening of opera-
tional capabilities and effectiveness of the most importanat institutions as well as de-
velopment of international relations based on respect for law and effective multilateral
cooperation in accordance with goals and rules defined in the charter of United Nations
[ibid., p. 5].
We claim that this definition of national interests are the most important part of
strategy because for over 50 years Poland remained under the communist regime and
could not shape its owns safety system but was to implement tasks assigned by the
Soviets for the period of its war with the West. For a long time in its history Poland had
not had a chance to become a subject of its own fate – key decisions for the nation
were not located in Poland, but in the hands of Soviet power apparatus – its outbreak
and caused deep national frustration. Thus the country deemed to lone fight with the
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Germans and which nevertheless had and army with 600 thousand soldiers (both in the
West and in the East) lost support of its allies who in Teheran and Jalta Treaties created
new order in Europe.
Polish understanding of safety and national interest is related with all opportunities
but is not limited to them. Poland achieved more to redefine its national and defense
interests than many countries which use benefits related to democracy and welfare in
postwar Europe. Safety in a perspective assumed in quated document takes into ac-
count not only national interest and not only its requirements.
It is not single side understanding of safety as obligation to its preservation. It is
a global understanding which assigns a distinct role to Poland – keeping all proportions
– a definite role in keeping peace in the world.
Citizens live with a sense of growing level in national safety. Percentage of people
convinced that there are no risks to Poland’s independence is almost 5 times higher
than percentage of people who think otherwise. In 1991 more people allowed possibil-
ity of threats than those who thought otherwise.
Figure 18.1: Sense of Threat to Poland’s Independence in the Opinion of Respondents
Source: Opinions on the situation of Poland in international relations and relations with Germany,
Public opinion, CBOS Research Analysis, Warsaw, July, p. 14
Increasing sense of safety creates and will create tensions among public opinion and
government decisions stemming from international obligations assumed by the state.
Citizens are not prone to share the opinion that Poland should participate in foreign
military missions and should get engaged in military conflicts of today’s world. It is
illustrated by Table 18.1. The same happens in all democratic societies of the West.
Citizens are more and more against the military engagement of their countries in con-
flicted areas of the world. Government must and do take that into account. Polish gov-
ernments are in no better condition – they will also have to take into account critical
opinion of their citizens.
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Table 18.1: Support for Military Mission in Afganistan
Date answer was givenDo you support
participation of Polish
army in Afganistan? XII 2001 I 2002 II 2002 IV 2002 X 2006 I 2007 VI 2007
Definitely yes 17 16 19 22 4 17 3
Rather yes 28
45
27
43
28
47
35
57
12
16
28
45
14
17
Neutral 5 8 7 5 5 5 5
Rather no 23 24 22 18 29 30 30
Definitely no 21
44
19
43
20
42
14
32
47
76
45
75
48
78
Difficult to say 6 6 5 4 8 5 5
Source: Public opinion, CBOS Research Analysis, Warsaw June 2007, p. 15
Similarily unpopular decision in Poland is related to installation of Anti-Missile
Shield (Figure 18.2). In 2005 the majority of respondents was ready to support this
decision. After 3 years those proportions drastically changed – in April 2008 the ma-
jority was against and we dares that this percentage shall increase.
Figure 18.2: Support for Decision to Host Elements of Anti-Missile Defence System in Poland
Source: Public opinion, CBOS Research Analysis, Warsaw, May 2007, p. 15
3. DECISION ON INSTALLATION IN POLAND ELEMENTS
    OF AMERICAN ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE SHIELD
Anti-Missile Defense Shield is a common notion for American, multinational, in-
cluding all the world defense system. National missile defense (NMD) as a generic
term is a military strategy and associated systems to shield an entire country against
incoming Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The missiles could be inter-
cepted by other missiles, or possibly by lasers. They could be intercepted near the
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launch point (boost phase), during flight through space (mid-course phase), or during
atmospheric descent (terminal phase).The overall limited U.S. nationwide antimissile
program in development since the 1990s. After the renaming in 2002, the term now
refers to the entire program, not just the ground-based interceptors and associated fa-
cilities. Other elements yet to be integrated into NMD may include sea-based, space-
-based, laser, and high altitude missile systems. The NMD program is limited in scope
and designed to counter a relatively small ICBM attack from a less sophisticated adver-
sary. Unlike the earlier Strategic Defense Initiative program, it is not designed to be
a robust shield against a large attack from a technically sophisticated adversary.
The system is coordinated by Missile Defense Agency, its mission is to develop, test
and prepare for deployment of a missile defense system. Using complementary intercep-
tors, land-, sea-, air- and space-based sensors, and battle management command and con-
trol systems, the planned missile defense system will be able to engage all classes and
ranges of ballistic missile threats. Our programmatic strategy is to develop, rigorously test,
and continuously evaluate production, deployment and operational alternatives for the
ballistic missile defense system. Missile defense systems being developed and tested by
MDA are primarily based on hit-to-kill technology. It has been described as hitting a bullet
with a bullet – a capability that has been successfully demonstrated in test after test
MDA divides its systems into 3 categories, boost phase, mid-course phase and ter-
minal phase, each corresponding to a different phase of the threat ballistic missile flight
regime. Each phase offers different advantages and disadvantages to a missile defense
system (see missile defense classified by trajectory phase), thus the layered defense
approach concept should improve overall defense effectiveness
At the moment Poland faces an important decision on installation elements of
American Anti Missile Shield on its territory. In the USA the opponents argued against
hight costs and technical feasibility of NMD (National Missile Defence). High cost,
political dangers, possible armament drive and worsening of international relations.
Nevertheless the Congress accepted NMD project.
In the USA the decision process on NMD (National Missile Defence) was sup-
ported by Prof. T. Saaty (2001).
Tests on public opinion in Poland show that the majority of society is against building
anti missile shield in Poland. Some politicians, citizens and academicians supports in-
stallation of anti missile shield in Poland, others are against. In the most popular internet
search engines show over milion record where anti missile shield in Poland is entered.
In this context, the article presents various alternatives on Poland’s national safety
management.
 3.1. ALTERNATIVES TO POLAND’S SAFETY MANAGEMENT
We assumed three possible defense systems for Poland:
 Installation of the National Missile Defense system in Poland;
 Common defense policy within the structure of the EU including building union
military forces (within European Safety Policy and Defence ESP&D);
 Common defense policy within NATO (NATO consists of 21 countries belong-
ing to the EU as well).
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The above alternatives are considered in Poland by both politicians and academics.
Each of them has its positive sides as well as its limitations. In order to choose the best
alternative to solve the problem we used Analytical Network Process. It makes it pos-
sible to undertake an optimal variant of our country defense. In the ANP method com-
parison direction stems from connections betwenn elements and roles of common in-
terdependencies.
Decisional ANP structures “benefits”, “costs”, “opportunties” and “risks” are a net-
work of mutual relations among the most important factors taken into account in
a decision process. Those networks are constructed in four fields of possible Poland’s
national safety management system; economic, political, social and technological.
The assumed problem was solved with use of Super Decisions software.
3.2. OPTIMAL DECISION CHOICE STEPS
Steps in the choice of the best defense strategy for Poland within the framework of
Analytical Network Process can be presented as follows:
(1) Presenting a decisional problem in details in the context of ANP method that
is decision’s goals, criteria, subcriteria, actors – decision process participants;
their objectives, points of view on the problem to be considered, possible al-
ternatives of Poland’s best defence strategy. Providing detailed factors, which
shall influence the final decision.
(2) Describing control criteria and subcriteria within four control hierarchies for
merits (personal merits): benefits (B), opportunities (O), costs (C) and risks
(R) of the above-defined decision.
(3) In control criteria subsets for BOCR we build a structure in the form of a hier-
archy tree including key elements (criteria and subcriteria). Each subnet is
constructed in the form of a cluster with objectives’ nod. Clusters of the main
BOCR merits (benefits, opportunities, costs and risks) Subcriteria clusters are
related to one of the main criteria. In order to calculate priorities we connect
goals with criteria and each criterion with their subcriteria. We make pairwise
comparisons for all network elements in order to calculate priorities for sub-
criteria. Each subcriterion is a potential “control criterion” in the further net-
work analysis.
(4) We make criteria pairwise comparisons separately for each BOCR, and next
subcriteria to criteria in the four control hierarchies (on prof. T.L. Saaty’s fun-
damental scale). In the case of benefits and opportunities, we ask a question
while comparing criteria and subcriteria what ensures the largest benefits in
the best defense strategy for Poland and what constitutes the largest hidden
benefits – opportunities in relation to the control criterion. In the case of costs
and risks a question should be asked about what is the largest cost in the
preparation phase and at the moment Poland building defence strategy or what
shall lead to the largest hidden costs that is risks.
(5) We calculate global priorities by multiplying priorities for a criterion times
a priority for a subciterion for the four designated BOCR merits.
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(6) For further implementation of decision process, 20–30% of the most important
subcriteria from the entire network (with priorities over 3%), for the four
BOCR control criteria, account approximately 70–80% of the total sum of pri-
orities for all subcriteria. These are usually those sub criteria, which achieved
the merits for the global priorities over 3%. The values of global priorities for
subcriteria were calculated by dividing each local priority for a subcriterion by
four (four BOCR control criteria). It significantly simplifies our decision proc-
ess to follow, because we only analyze the most important criteria determining
defense strategy for Poland, following the Vilfredo Pareto “20/80” rule. This
rule, formulated by the Italian economist, means that 80% of results achieved
by each manager follows implementation of 20% of his tasks whereas 80% of
activities are responsible only for 20% of effects.
(7) Constructing a general clusters’ (or components’) network and their elements,
concerning all BOCR control criteria. Subnets in relation to control criteria are
the lowest network level in the model of Poland’s bulding military forces.
(8) Building decision subnets for each selected control criterion. During that step
we introduce a cluster of alternatives – i) Installation of the National Missile
Defense system in Poland (NMD – National Missile Defence), ii) Common
defense policy within the structure of the EU, iii) Common defense policy
within NATO. A cluster of the above defined alternatives must be present in
each decision subnet with other clusters. In the ANP method and the Super
Decision software supporting solution of multicriteria network, problem are
a real network loop, and resemble networks between coal mine, steelworks
and coal power plant.
(9) For each control criterion (or subcriterion) those clusters are defined (with
their elements) which influence other clusters (or elements) in relation to
a given criterion or they themselves can be under influence of other clusters or
elements. Importance (being under influence or exerting influence) must be
applied to all criteria of all control hierarchies for a total response. In a graphic
presentation of the model, clusters are connected with arrows following their
external and internal dependencies and influences. There is an arrow from
each cluster connecting it to another cluster, which influences that cluster or
its elements.
(10) We make appropriate connection between nods and make pairwise compari-
sons of clusters with each other, in relation to a given criterion. In benefits (B)
decision subnet we make pairwise comparisons of clusters (with using T. Sa-
aty’s fundamental scale), by asking questions: which cluster (or its elements)
are the most beneficial in the context of analized subcriterion? Similar ques-
tions are asked in Opportunities (O) subnet. The best alternative gives the
highest priorities for benefits and opportunities. In Risks (R) and Costs (C) de-
cision subnets, during the cluster pairwise comparisons we ask questions:
which are more expensive or risky? The worst alternative gives the highest
priorities for Risks and Costs.
(11) For each control criterion we construct a supermatrix. Appropriate categories
should include priorities following cluster comparisons in the net.
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(12) Pairwise comparisons of elements within clusters with respect to their influ-
ence on each element in subsequent clusters with which they are connected
(external dependence) or elements of the same clusters (internal interdepend-
ence). While making comparisons we should always take into account the
criterion which is a context for our comparisons. Elements are compared with
respect to the influence of a given element which influences another element
to a greater extent and the greater importance within T. Saaty’s scale than an-
other element it is compared to. Those comparisons must take into account
control criterion or control hierarchy criterion.
(13) Cluster comparisons with respect to their influences on the control criterion.
Calculated weights are used to weigh elements of respective blocks of super-
matrix columns. Zero is assigned to those comparisons, where there is no in-
fluence, between compared clusters. This way we obtain a supermatrix sto-
chastically weighted.
(14) Estimating the importance of each subsystem, that is benefits (B), opportuni-
ties (O), costs (C) and risks (R) of a problem in question. In taking any deci-
sion its significance differs in relation to (B), opportunities (O), costs (C) and
risks (R). Hence we have to prioritize them by estimating strategic criteria.
Those criteria constitute our system of merits. With respect to merits we esti-
mate the importance of best alternatives (B, O, C, R) of the solving problem
– for example very high, high, medium, low, very low.
(15) Synthesizing priorities limited by weighing each idealized criteria. We choose
the best alternative using the multiplicative formula (BO/CR) by dividing
a multiplication of variant priorities for benefits and opportunities by the mul-
tiplication of costs and risks. The other formula for choosing the best variant is
additive – negative (bB + oO – Cc – rR). In the latter formula the importance
of each subsystem i.e. benefits (b), opportunities (o), costs (c) and risks (r) for
a given problem must be estimated. The optimal variant has a higher result.
(16) Sensitivity analysis of a final result. The analysis concerns “what – if” ques-
tions. It makes possible to determine whether the final answer is stable and to
what extent it will allow to change the input data concerning evaluations or
priorities. It is particularly interesting to see whether those changes can be
measured with a compatibility index (SI).
3.3. ESTIMATING CRITERIA AND SUBCRITERIA WITHIN
       FOUR MERITS – COSTS, BENEFITS, OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS
Within assumed merits the following criteria were analysed: economic, social, tech-
nological and political. Next, main criteria were compared with each other. Pairwise
comparisons started with verbal comparison between elements on Saaty’s fundamental
scale from balanced (1) do extreme (9) (Table 18.2). After comparisons of verbal crite-
ria, numerical priorities were calculated, based on the comparison matrix. In turn,
within assumed criteria, appropriate subcriteria were selected to optimally characterize
various alternatives. After their pairwise comparisons, local priorities were calculated.
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Table 18.2: Saaty’s 9-point Fundamental Scale for Pairwise Comparisons
Importance/
Preference/Likelihood
Definition Explanation
1
equal impor-
tance/preference/likehood
two elements contribute equally to the goal/parent
element
3 weak dominance
experience or judgment slightly favors one element
over another
5 strong dominance
experience or judgment strongly favors one ele-
ment over another
7
demonstrated (very strong)
dominance
experience or judgment strongly very strongly
favors one element over another (an element’s
dominance is demonstrated in practice)
9 absolute dominance
the evidence favoring an element over another is
affirmed to the highest possible order
2, 4, 6, 8 intermediate values further subdivision or compromise if needed
1.1–1.9 for elements closely related
Inverse values transitivity of comparisons
All values were presented in Table 18.3. They show that the most optimal value to
build Poland’s defense strategy is constant economic growth and closer relations with
the Europen Union. Opportunities, in turn, be seen in the sale of military equipment
and assistance in increasing energetic safety.
Table 18.3: Prioritization of Control Criteria I of ANP Model Elements of Benefits, Costs,
Opportunities and Risks of Poland’s Defence Strategy
Merits Criteria Sub-criteira
Local
priorities
Global
priorities
reforms of the military forces 0.105 0.015
development of military industry 0.258 0.038
economic
(0.539)
constant economic growth 0.637 0.080
strengthening command system in Polish army 0.833 0.022social
(0.106) strengthening alliance with the USA 0.167 0.004
modern air defense system 0.125 0.004technological
(0.138) modern anti-missile defense system 0.875 0.030
closer cooperation with the EU 0.833 0.045
Benefits
(B)
political
(0.217) american guarantee for the ational security for
all citizens
0.167 0.009
long-term military support 0.268 0.036
contracts for production of the equipment for
american army
0.117 0.015
economical
(0.540)
selling military equipment 0.614 0.083
economic investments in the Słupsk region 0.167 0.012social
(0.297) support in the area energy safety 0.833 0.061
lifting visas for Polish visitors to America 0.833 0.034
Opportunity
(O)
political
(0.163) moral support form American Polish community 0.167 0.007
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modernisation of Polish army 0.201 0.032
negative impact on the environment 0.066 0.011
participation in the financing of the NMD
system
0.103 0.017
economical
(0.649)
building long and medium range missiles 0.629 0.102
losing part of freedom 0.833 0.058social
(0.279) extraterritolity of the US base in Poland 0.167 0.047
deterioration of relationship with the EU 0.833 0.012
Costs
(C)
political
(0.072) risk of rerrorist attack 0.167 0.003
alienation of Poland in the EU 0.833 0.025economical
(0.119) weakening position of Poland in NATO 0.167 0.005
social
(0.098)
weakening nation identity 1.000 0.024
infiltration and dependency on the USA 0.105 0.013
enemies in the Islamic communities 0.258 0.032
political
(0.497)
worsening relations with Russia 0.637 0.079
mistakes in the American defensive systems 0.333 0.024
Risks
(R)
technological
(0.286) mistakes in the offensive systems of the enemy
countries to the USA
0.067 0.048
3.4. BUILDING DECISION SUBNETS FOR EACH SPECIFIC CRITERION
At this stage we introduce a cluster of three alternatives into the model. We build
subnets for selected subcriteria from the previous stage in relation to the four values:
benefits, costs, opportunities and risks. We compare clusters with each other in the
Saaty’s scale. Selected decision subnets for the 4 criteria are shown in respective
Figures 18.3–6.
3.5. ESTIMATING PRIORITIES FOR BASIC VALUES
       FOR B – BENEFITS, O – OPPORTUNITIES, C – COSTS,
       AND R – RISKS
To estimate those values it is necessary to build a separate network in Super Deci-
sions network that is, to some extent superior to our network built so far. Prof. T. Saaty
names that “view onto our problem from a more general perspective – a bird’s eye
view”. Network built in such way is presented in Figure 18.7.
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Figure 18.3: Subnet for Sevelopment of Military Industry
Figure 18.4: Subnet for Modernisation of Polish Army
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Figure 18.5: Subnet for Enemies in Islamic Communities
Figure 18.6: ANP Network for Social Risks of “Worsening of Relations with the Russian Federation”
Comparing criteria and subcriteria among each other we set priorities for them.
Each strategic criterion was further divided into respective subcriteria, used for ranking
of BOCR subsystems. Individual criteria and their priorities to estimate the weight
(importance) of BOCR were presented in Table 18.4.
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Figure 18.7: Management of Poland’s National Safety (Strategic Criteria Model)
Table 18.4: Assessment of the Strategic Criteria – Importance of BOCR
Personal
criteria
V. high High Medium Low V. low Pi
V. high 1 2 3 4 5 0.42
High ½ 1 2 3 4 0.26
Medium ⅓ ½ 1 2 3 0.16
Low ¼ ⅓ ½ 1 2 0.10
V. low 1⁄5 ¼ ⅓ ½ 1 0.06
Σ 1.00
Estimation of strategic criteria make it possible to relate received results within
BOCR subsystems and calculating of final result.
3.6. OPTIMAL ALTERNATIVE CHOICE
In choosing the optimal decision alternative regarding Poland’s defense strategy we
connected values of priorities of BOCR network variant. It was implemented in two
ways – as the first a multiplicative mathematical formula BO/CR was used, whereby
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priorities values were divided for specific alternatives from benefits and opportunities
models by respetive costs and risks models. The best alternative assumes the highest
calculated quotient. Results were presented in Table 18.5.
Table 18.5: Final Scores of ANP Analysis
Alternatives/Merits
Benefits
0.272
Costs
0.184
Opportunities
0.328
Risks
0.216
Multiplicative
BO/CR
Additive-Negative
bB + oO – cC – rR
Installation of the
National Missile
Defense system in
Poland
0.487 0.398 0.380 0.358 1.4226 0.0037
Common defense
policy within the
structure of the EU
0.542 0.615 0.429 0.405 1.9185 0.0324
Common defense
policy within the
structure of NATO
0.386 0.203 0.412 0.507 0.3751         –0.1023
The table proves that the best alternative for Poland’s defense strategy is Common
defense policy within EU, including middle and far range of anti missile shield. Instal-
lation of elements of American National Missile Defense Shield NMD is slightly
worse, whereas the worst is common defense policy within NATO.
4. FINAL CONCLUSIONS
 32 BOCR criteria included in ANP model comprise economic, social, techno-
logical and political factors that determine national safety system in Poland;
 As a result of conducted prioritization two mathematical formulas give similar
results for the following alternative: Common defense policy within EU, in-
cluding middle and far range of anti missile shield;
 Sensitivity analysis can to a small extent change the value of priorities of con-
sidered alternatives, but it requires extreme assumptions for prioritizing of
BOCR and proper control criteria;
 Analytical Network Process method made us realize the complexity of national
safety and made numerical priotization of various element in subsystmes of
benefits, costs, opportunities and risks possible;
 This method can be used to solving several conflicts in order to set peace.
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